We propose a Discrete Event Systems (DES) approach to the failure diagnosis problem. We present a methodology for modeling physical systems in a DES framework. We discuss the notion of diagnosability and present the construction procedure of the diagnoser. Finally, we illustrate our approach using a Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system.
Introduction
The problem of failure diagnosis has received considerable attention in the literature of reliability engineering, control, and computer science and a wide variety of schemes have been proposed. Failure diagnosis using fault trees has been studied in detail by reliability engineers [6] , [7] , [HI. Quantitative, analytical-modelbased r-r : hods have been extensively studied by control systems researchers [a] , [19] , while expert systems and other knowledge-based schemes for diagnosis have been proposed by computer scientists [3] , [12] . Recently, the problem of failure diagnosis has also been studied in the framework of discrete event systems (DES) [l] , [4] , [SI, [9] , [18] . (See [15] for a survey of some of the popular methods of fault detection. ) We propose in this paper a DES approach to the failure diagnosis problem that expands on the work in [16] . The proposed method of fault diagnosis is applicable not only to systems that fall naturally in the class of DES (communication networks and computer systems, for instance), but also to systems traditionally treated as continuous variable dynamic systems and modeled by differential equations. One of the major advantages of the proposed method is that it does not require detailed indepth modeling of the system to be diagnosed and hence is ideally suited for the diagnosis of large complex systems like Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) units, power plants, and semiconductor processes. Other application areas include engine diagnosis and automated manufacturing systems.
Our approach to failure diagnosis involves two major steps: developing a discrete event model of the system to be diagnosed followed by construction of the diagnoser. The discrete event model that we develop captures both the normal and the failed behavior of the system. The failures are modeled as unobservable events and the objective is to infer about past occurrences of these failures 0-7803-1 968-0/94$4.0001994 IEEE on the basis of the observed events. The diagnoser is a finite state machine (FSM) built from the system model. This machine performs diagnosis when it observes on-line the behaviour of the system. The diagnoser provides estimates of the state of the system after the occurrence of every observable event. In addition, states of the diagnoser carry failure information and occurrences of failures can be detected (with a finite delay) by inspecting these states. This approach to diagnosis is appropriate for failures that involve significant changes in the status of system components but do not necessarily bring the system to a halt.
In Section 2 we describe model building for diagnosis. In Section 3 we present the notion of I-diagnosability and the construction and applications of I-diagnosers. Next, we illustrate our approach to failure diagnosis with an example of an HVAC system. Finally, in Section 5 we summarize the main results of this paper.
Model Building for Diagnosis
Suppose that the system to be diagnosed has N individual components; typically, these components consist of equipment and controllers. We first build DES models for these components. Let G, = ( X , , E,, IS,, zo,) refer to the finite state machine (FSM) model of the ith component; here X, is the state space, C, is the event set, 6, is the transition function, and ZO, is the initial state of G,. The states in X, and the events in C, reflect the normal and the failed behaviour of the ith component. Some of the events in C, are observable, i.e, their occurrence can be observed, while the rest are unobservable. Typically, the observable events include commands issued by the controllers while the unobservable events include failure events.
Next, we compose these individual models using the standard Synchronous Composition operation on state machines (see, e.g., [SI). Let This completes the model building procedure for diagnosis. The system to be diagnosed is now represented by the discrete event model G = ( X , C , 6 , z o ) where X = X U X,,, and X,,, denotes the set of all new states znew introduced in step (iia) above.
Note that the model G accounts for the normal and failed behaviour of the system. The observable events in this system may be one of the following : commands issued by the controllers and sensor readings immediately after the execution of the above commands, and changes of sensor readings. The unobservable events may be failure events or other events which cause changes in the system state not recorded by sensors.
We note at this point that the proposed approach to diagnosis is not limited to the case of equipment and controller failures. Sensor failures too can be handled in this framework by simply treating the sensor as an additional component of the system. In other words, we develop in addition to the equipment and controller models, explicit discrete event models, which include both normal and failed states, for those sensors that can fail. Example 2.1: consider an elementary HV.4C system consisting of a pump, a valve, and a controller. Table 1. 3. Diagnosability and Diagnosers
The Notion of I-diagnosability
Let G = (X, C, 6,zo) represent the discrete event model of the system to be diagnosed. The behaviour of this DES is described by the prefix-closed language L ( G ) generated by G [ l l ] . Henceforth, we shall denote L(G) by L. We assume for simplicity that L is live, i.e., there is at least one transition defined at each state in X.
The event set C is partitioned as C = CO U E,, where CO represents the set of observable events and E,, the set of unobservable events. Since detection of failure events is based on observable transitions of the system, we assume that G does not generate arbitrarily long sequences of unobservable events. Let C j c C denote the set of failure events which are to be diagnosed. We assume, without loss of generality, that C j E,,, since an observable failure event can be trivially diagnosed. Our objective is to identify the occurrence, if any, of the failure events given partial event observations, i.e, when we observe only part of the traces generated by the system. In this regard, we associate to every failure event in C j , one or more observable indicator events. Let C I c CO denote the set of indicator events and let Zj : C j -* 2'' denote the mapping between failure events and indicator events. The choice of these indicator events and their significance will become more apparent as we proceed. Next, we partition the set of failure events into m disjoint sets corresponding to different failure types: C f = C j l C j m such that, for each i = 1 ,..., m, u f l , uj2 E C j , + I j ( u j i ) = I j ( u j 2 ) and define Z(Cj,) = I j ( u j ) for any uf E C j , . We now have a set of observable events I ( C j , ) associated with every set C j , of the partition. Let IIj denote the partition on C j . This partition is motivated by the following considerations: (i) Inadequate instrumentation may render it impossible to diagnose uniquely every possible fault and (ii) We may not be required to identify uniquely the occurrence of every failure event. We may simply be interested in knowing if one of a set of failure events has happened, as for example, when the effect of the set of failures on the system is the same.
We now introduce some notation necessary for the subsequent development. Let 6 denote the empty trace and let X denote the prefix-closure of a trace s. Let C' denote the Kleene closure of the set C (see, e.g.,
We define the projection P : C' + C: in the usual manner [ll]: P simply 'erases' the unobservable events in a trace. The inverse projection operator PF1 is defined as: PL'(y) = {s E L : P ( s ) = y}. Finally, we define 3 ( C j , ) = { s u j E L : af E C j , } , i.e., Q ( C j , ) denotes the set of all traces of L that end in a failure event belonging to the class C f , . Likewise, * [ ( I ( C j , ) ] denotes the set of all traces in L that end in an observable event from the set I ( C j , ) . Consider U E C and 3 E E'. We use the notation U E s to denote the fact that U is an event U ... U in the trace s. With slight abuse of notation, we write C j , E s to denote the fact that uj E s for some uj E C j ; , or, formally, B n Q ( C j i ) # 0.
We propose the following notion of I-diagnosability.
Definition 1 A prefix-closed and live language L is said to be I-diagnosable with respect to the projection P , the partition l I j on C j , and the indicator map I if the following holds:
This definition of I-diagnosabdity means the following. Let stl be any trace generated by the system that contains in it a failure event from the set C j i followed by an indicator event from the set I ( C j , ) . Let t2 be any sufficiently long continuation of stl. Condition D then requires that every trace belonging to the language that produces the same record of observable events as the trace stltz should contain in it a failure event from the set C j , . This implies that along every continuation t 2 of sll one can detect the occurrence of a failure of the type C j ; with a finite delay, specifically, in at most n; transitions of the system after stl . Hence I-diagnosability requires that every failure event leads to observations distinct enough to enable unique identification of the failure type with a finite delay; note however that this is only required if the failure event is followed by one of its indicator events.
The use of indicator events in the above definition is motivated by the following physical consideration. Consider, for example, an HVAC system with a controller unit. Assume that when the controller fails it does not sense the presence of any load on the system and hence does not issue any commands to the valve. Suppose that during operation, the controller does fad and suppose i uther that it is possible for the system to execute an arbitrarily long sequence of events, which does not involve any of the valve commands. Under such conditions, it is obvious that one cannot diagnose any failure of the valve. However, this alone does not mean that the system is not I-diagnosable as stated in Definition 1. According to the requirements of this definition, we can associate as indicator events "open valve" and "close valve", respectively, with the valve failure events "stuck-closed" and "stuckopen", and require the system to execute the "open valve" event or the "close valve" event before deciding on its Idiagnosability. The system is considered I-diagnosable if after the execution of the corresponding indicator events it is possible to detect valve failures, while it is termed not I-diagnosable if even after the indicator event is executed the corresponding valve failure remains undetectable. To summarize, I-diagnosability requires detection of failures with bounded delay only after the occurrence of an indicator event corresponding to the failure.
The case of multiple failures from the same set of the partition deserves special attention. When more than one G ! T : x from the same set of the partition, say, C j , , occurs along a trace s of L , the above definition of Idiagnosability does not require that each of these occurrences be detected. It suffices to be able to conclude, within finitely many events, that along s, a failure from the set C j , happened. Refer to [14] for more details on the case of multiple failures.
The I-diagnoser
Consider the state space X of G and define Xo = {zo} U {z E X : z has an observable event into it}. Let gives estimates of the current state of the system after the occurrence of every observable event. The I-diagnose1 G; can be thought of as an eztended observerin which we append to every state estimate a label of the form mentioned above.
We now present a brief summary of the I-diagnose1 construction procedure. For a formal definition of the I-diagnose1 refer to [14] . We assume that the system is normal to start with and hence define the initial state of the I-diagnose1 to be (zo, {N}). Let the current state of the I-diagnose1 (which is the set of estimates of the current state of G with their corresponding labels) be q1 and let the next observed event be U . The new state of the I-diagnose1 qz is computed following a three step process: (i) For every state estimate z in q l , compute the reach due to U , defined to be S(z, U ) = {6(z, su) where s E Et,}. pairs computed following steps (i) and (ii) above, for each (.,e) in 91. Replace by (z',P') all (z',P'),(z',C") E q2 such that F, E P ' e Fi E err Vi E ( 1 , . . . , m } , I, E C' and I, 6 C". That is, if the same state estimate 2' appears more than once in qz with labels differering only in their I component, we eliminate from qz the pair that does not contain the I label.
We make the following observations on the I-diagnose1 G;: (i) The labels attached to the state estimates carry information on occurrences of failure events and on the corresponding indicator events. (ii) We append the I, label to any Conly if an indicator event from I ( C j , ) follows a failure event from Cja. The set of I, labels is always a subset of the set of F, labels in any ( z , L ) pair in q E Q d . ( iii) The Fa labels as well as the Z, labels propagate from state to state.
The following example illustrates the construction of Gi. In the illustrations that follow, we represent (z,!) pairs simply as z t for clarity. The I-diagnoser Gi described above serves two purposes: (i) to check if a given system is I-diagnosable and (ii) to perform diagnosis. In [14] we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for a system to be I-diagnosable. These conditions are stated on G i and are checked by examining cycles in G i and the system model G. Given an I-diagnosable system, failures can be detected by simply examining the state of G i . In [14] we introduce the notion of an F,-certain state, which is a state of the I-diagnoser G i such that every component of the state contains the label Fa. Whenever the I-diagnoser hits an F,-certain state, we conclude with certainty that a failure of type F, has occurred. We also have the following result on implementation in [14] . While it is necessary t o build the I-diagnoser Gi to check for I-diagnosability, i t is sufficient, for the purposes of implementation, to build a much smaller machine G i for this system is depicted in Figure 3 .
4.

Application to HVAC systems
We illustrate our approach to failure diagnosis with an example of an HVAC system. Figure 4 illustrates a complete HVAC system with controller. Suppose that the valve and the controller of this HVAC system are subject to failures. Figure 6 illustrates some of the component models. The models of the pump and the valve (not shown in Figure 6 ) are the same as in Figure 1 . In Figure   6 F1 and B1 represent the "off" positions of the fan and boiler, respectively, while F2 and B2 represent their "on" positions. The fan-on state F2 is equivalent to "PowerOn" in the system; likewise, F1 denotes "Power-off". The state LO in the load model is to be interpreted as unknown load; the load is assumed to be unknown when the system is not powered on. The state L1 represents the absence of heating load on the system and L2 the presence of a heating load; the events SPI and S P D denote an increase in set point (which indicates a demand on the heating system) and a decrease of set point (no load on the system), respectively.
The controller is modeled based on the following assumptions. (i) In normal mode of operation, the controller issues a sequence of commands, OV-PON-BON (open valve -pump on -boiler on) whenever it senses a load on the system. Likewise, it issues the commands CV-P O F F -B O F F (close valve -pump off -boiler off) when the load disappears. (U) When the controller fails off (i.e., when the event C F O F F occurs), it does not sense the presence of load on the system and hence does not issue any of the above commands. On the other hand, when it fails on (when C F O N occurs), it always presumes a positive load and consequently, has the system running regardless of whether a load is actually present rl. . , (iii) The controller does not fail during operation, Le., if it does fail, the failures occur at the start of operation. (This assumption is made for simplicity only.) (iv)
The System-Power-off command, FOFF, is issued when a time-out event occurs, for instance, at the end of a working day, but only if the controller senses no load on the system.
The system is assumed to have only one sensor, a valve flow sensor, whose outputs are F (flow) and NF (no flow).
The composite system obtained following the procedure of Section 2 has 104 states; 90 of these states form the accessible part of the synchronous composition while the rest are the new states introduced during the transition renaming process. (See [15] for the listing of the complete model.)
The initial state of the system is chosen to be (C1.Vl.Fl.Pl.Bl.LO). The only unobservable events in this system are the six failure events partitioned as fol- Examination of all other such cycles in the I-diagnose1 (not shown in Figure 5 ) in the context of the necessary and sufficient conditions for I-diagnosability presented in [14] reveals that this system is I-diagnosable. With this knowledge, it would then suffice t o implement the simpler Gd (and not G: ) for on-line diagnosis of the system. Here G d has 97 states. (See [15] .)
A variation of the above example, where this time the pump and valve can fail, is treated in [15] .
Conclusion
We have considered the problem of failure diagnosis for large complex systems from the point of view of DES. The underlying theory for our approach is developed in detail in [14] . (See [13] for a brief exposition of some of the results of [14] .) The focus of the present paper has been on the modeling of systems for the purpose of diagnosis and on the application of this theory to examples from Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning units. We note here that the component models of the HVAC system that we have used are generic to a lot of engineering systems. Further, the nature of the models discussed indicates the potential applicability of our approach to a wide class of systems.
There are two crucial issues regarding the applicability of our theory to HVAC units or other classes of systems: (i) building the system model and (ii) dealing with the computational complexity of the diagnosis process. With regard to model building, we have proposed in this paper a systematic metholodogy for obtaining the complete system model from the (simpler) models of the individual components and from the information provided by the sensors. We emphasize that our methodology translates sensor information into events and thus all the information is captured in a pure event-based model. Building the individual component models, of course, may not be a trivial task and calls for knowledge of the application domain and engineering judgement in selecting the right level of abstraction. With regard to computational complexity, it is clear that since we are dealing with a partially observed system, in the worst case, the computational complexity of constructing diagnosers can be exponential in the size of the state space of the complete system model. This is an unavoidable feature of partial observation problems; however, two remarks are in order. First, our approach is scalable (up to computational limitations) because it is formal and systematic: given a library of individual component models that include normal and faulty behaviour, everything else is solved algorithmically. Second, our experience so far, while limited in scope, tends to indicate that the system often has enough structure so that the worst case computational bounds may be rarely attained. 
